The House Democrats proposal to make Southwestern Connecticut pay more to Hartford makes me think of George Orwell's dystopian novel Animal Farm where ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL, BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS.
I wish the proposed tax would affect me. I'm not too concerned about the personal well-being of the affected demographic should the new tax become law. What concerns me is some of the language legislators use to promote and defend their proposal. People making a lot of money won't "miss an extra $20 or $30 per week;" "the most fortunate should chip in more," etc. Is this how serious public policy should be presented? I can see Napoleon (George Orwell's pig that is) saying a lot of these same things. Why weren't legislators thinking about the most needy and the programs that serve them in 2005 and 2006, for example, when tax receipts were surprising Hartford to the upside?
Connecticut's original income tax was temporary. A half percent higher and still here... Hartford legislators don't understand what we meant by voting in a balanced budget amendment. It's not "good economy - big spend, bad economy - big tax." Balanced-budgeting presupposes rainy-day and trust funds. You build reserves during good years to cushion the lean years. Fiscal policy should be counter-cyclical, not reinforce the downturn (or stoke the bubbles). We're faced with a state budget deficit of $8 to $9 billion over two years. I'm not sure trying to carve a few more chunks out of the golden goose (Southwestern Connecticut) is an intelligent policy. It may also not be workable; like big corporations, the rich are quite good at avoiding taxes they view as confiscatory.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
Monday, April 26, 2010
Crazy like a fox?
Crazy like a fox?
Maybe the Republican delegation in Hartford has it all wrong; the best course of action in the face of the Great Recession is not responsible budgeting but rather a game of chicken with the federal government. Maybe the Democratic Congressional majority is on to something: put on a good poker face and spend like its 1999. Taxpayers have transferred almost one trillion (with a "t") dollars to the U.S. financial system (about 8% of GDP) while the states have gotten less than one hundred billion (with a "b"). Maybe the Hartford Dems are thinking that Connecticut can be just as too big to fail than any of the banks. Washington D.C. will have to blink first and give us more bailout money. C’mon Nutmeggers, let’s roll the dice for 2010 ‘cause mamma needs a new pair of shoes…..
Maybe the Republican delegation in Hartford has it all wrong; the best course of action in the face of the Great Recession is not responsible budgeting but rather a game of chicken with the federal government. Maybe the Democratic Congressional majority is on to something: put on a good poker face and spend like its 1999. Taxpayers have transferred almost one trillion (with a "t") dollars to the U.S. financial system (about 8% of GDP) while the states have gotten less than one hundred billion (with a "b"). Maybe the Hartford Dems are thinking that Connecticut can be just as too big to fail than any of the banks. Washington D.C. will have to blink first and give us more bailout money. C’mon Nutmeggers, let’s roll the dice for 2010 ‘cause mamma needs a new pair of shoes…..
Re: Conflict of Interest
Re: Conflict of Interest
I read with interest Messrs.’ Freundlich and Shalit’s back-and-forth regarding a possible Pavia appointment. Although it feels like our entire political system has become one big conflict of interest with politicians engaging in pay-to-play, setting up their relatives as lobbyists, nominating their girlfriends for important legal jobs, taking private sector jobs the second they leave office, writing tell-all books, etc one of the most important concepts for a loyal opposition is allowing a winning politician – particularly those in executive roles – the chance to name their own team.
Federal, state and local bureaucracies are very entrenched and it has become increasingly difficult for executives at any level to implement their agenda. They must be allowed to name people they are comfortable with. Historically, most executive level politicians find out that one or two of their loyal and friendly appointees were a mistake. The more successful Presidents, governors and mayors have quickly shunted their pals off to the side and brought in more capable technocrats for damage control and policy implementation. Short of a glaring and obvious problem, Mayor Pavia’s appointments should be supported until they prove us otherwise. Executive level public servants should at least be given the full opportunity to succeed.
I read with interest Messrs.’ Freundlich and Shalit’s back-and-forth regarding a possible Pavia appointment. Although it feels like our entire political system has become one big conflict of interest with politicians engaging in pay-to-play, setting up their relatives as lobbyists, nominating their girlfriends for important legal jobs, taking private sector jobs the second they leave office, writing tell-all books, etc one of the most important concepts for a loyal opposition is allowing a winning politician – particularly those in executive roles – the chance to name their own team.
Federal, state and local bureaucracies are very entrenched and it has become increasingly difficult for executives at any level to implement their agenda. They must be allowed to name people they are comfortable with. Historically, most executive level politicians find out that one or two of their loyal and friendly appointees were a mistake. The more successful Presidents, governors and mayors have quickly shunted their pals off to the side and brought in more capable technocrats for damage control and policy implementation. Short of a glaring and obvious problem, Mayor Pavia’s appointments should be supported until they prove us otherwise. Executive level public servants should at least be given the full opportunity to succeed.
Wednesday, January 6, 2010
Afghanistan
July 14, 2009
I read that 15 British soldiers were blown up and killed by road-side bombs during two recent weeks in the Helmand Province offensive in Afghanistan.
The UK press is criticizing 10 Downing Street for trying to fight this was on the cheap. Insufficient numbers of helicopters have forced British soldiers to slog it out over IED-strewn roads.
Our own military has faced the same type of issue not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq. Officially, we spend about $400 billion year on defense yet most of this seems to go to hi-tech weapons systems procurement, acquisition and maintenance.
We have invested relatively little in the common foot soldier to radically reshape his combat experience. Only when blown up, shot or burned do our fighting men have access to an amazing new paradigm: 21st century battlefield medical care. But until they’re hurt, the infantryman’s experience is little changed from previous wars.
Part of the problem is that while many people have been in the military, very few have been in combat. Donald Rumsfeld is such a person. While he loves to advertise his military credentials he was never in combat; had he been, he would know that war has an Alice-in-Wonderland effect on the world. A lean and striped-down military would have been wonderful peace-time reform. But anyone who has been in combat knows that everything always goes wrong and never as planned or sometimes even imagined. The only protection for this is redundancy.
In addition to being a poor planner, Mr. Rumsfeld has no honor. On his repeated visits to Iraq he never once ventured out in an “up-armored” “Humvee”, let-alone the standard U.S. issue. He was always safely ensconced in a Rhino Runner. Combat leaders know one of the biggest morale boosters at their disposal is enduring the same suffering, hardship and fear as their troops.
We’ve been in Iraq and Afghanistan longer than we fought WWII while our automotive industry was decaying. It seems quite amazing that we have yet to protect every single one of our soldiers as well as those of our allies if necessary in adequately armored vehicles.
I read that 15 British soldiers were blown up and killed by road-side bombs during two recent weeks in the Helmand Province offensive in Afghanistan.
The UK press is criticizing 10 Downing Street for trying to fight this was on the cheap. Insufficient numbers of helicopters have forced British soldiers to slog it out over IED-strewn roads.
Our own military has faced the same type of issue not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq. Officially, we spend about $400 billion year on defense yet most of this seems to go to hi-tech weapons systems procurement, acquisition and maintenance.
We have invested relatively little in the common foot soldier to radically reshape his combat experience. Only when blown up, shot or burned do our fighting men have access to an amazing new paradigm: 21st century battlefield medical care. But until they’re hurt, the infantryman’s experience is little changed from previous wars.
Part of the problem is that while many people have been in the military, very few have been in combat. Donald Rumsfeld is such a person. While he loves to advertise his military credentials he was never in combat; had he been, he would know that war has an Alice-in-Wonderland effect on the world. A lean and striped-down military would have been wonderful peace-time reform. But anyone who has been in combat knows that everything always goes wrong and never as planned or sometimes even imagined. The only protection for this is redundancy.
In addition to being a poor planner, Mr. Rumsfeld has no honor. On his repeated visits to Iraq he never once ventured out in an “up-armored” “Humvee”, let-alone the standard U.S. issue. He was always safely ensconced in a Rhino Runner. Combat leaders know one of the biggest morale boosters at their disposal is enduring the same suffering, hardship and fear as their troops.
We’ve been in Iraq and Afghanistan longer than we fought WWII while our automotive industry was decaying. It seems quite amazing that we have yet to protect every single one of our soldiers as well as those of our allies if necessary in adequately armored vehicles.
Tuesday, January 5, 2010
Najibullah could have been a contender
9/11 confirmed state-sponsored terrorism as a threat to national security. It is the equivalent of 16th century state-sponsored piracy. “Generic” terrorism, like free-lance piracy, is “only” a scourge.
Statehood confers a myriad of capacities. This makes the vacuum in failed and the chaos in failing states a national security risk.
Even more worrisome than state-sponsored terrorism is the state-sponsored spread of weapons and technologies of mass destruction (WTMD).
The end of the twentieth century combined the fall of the USSR with the rise of radical, intolerant, militant Islam (RIMI). This proved to be a combustible mix. While not a declared policy, we at a minimum enabled RIMI as part of our strategy to obliterate the USSR.
Although a noble goal, winning the Cold War in total fashion by annihilating the USSR was risky to our national security. We helped create one of the biggest failed state episodes in history.
The USSR had become the FSU and much of it was now an arms and scientific talent bazaar.
We compounded our risk by supporting a drunkard who allowed his cronies to plunder state and natural resources. For good measure, he also gave the go-ahead for the invasion of Chechnya.
Critics of current US foreign policy fault the US Administration for resurrecting British Imperial-era policies. Ironically, we are – perhaps unwittingly – pursuing a foreign policy designed by the Politburo almost 40 years ago.
By the 1970s, the Soviets realized that Islam posed a long-term threat to security along their southern border. Muslim fertility rates greatly out-stripped almost every other group’s both inside and outside Soviet borders. In part, Kremlin leaders addressed this threat by supporting a secular regime in Afghanistan.
What started out as a risky gambit against historical odds (even Alexander had to cut a face-saving deal, marry into a local clan, and leave after 3 years of vicious fighting) turned into a cataclysm.
Collapsing natural resource prices, a lousy economic system, and a politically and economically resurgent Anglo-American alliance made a precarious situation for the Soviets in Afghanistan even worse.
Nobody in the Kremlin envisioned the visceral response from Afghanistan’s nationalities. Their response was legitimized by Islam and fuelled by Arab cash. In our glee at Soviet misfortune, we poured in weapons, cash, and intelligence into Afghanistan. One of the bag men for this outside help to Afghanistan was a young, six foot five inch disaffected Saudi.
And the rest is unfortunately history.
“Expansionist” Islam as Connecticut’s Independent Senator calls it is a Malthusian certainty given current fertility trends. On the basis of population growth, the Mormon Church is a greater “threat.”
Different than for the Soviets, mainstream Islam does not pose a threat to our national security. RIMI does.
Further, our war should not be on global terrorism generally, but rather on state-sponsored terrorism.
These distinctions are important and worth remembering.
Our main war effort should be against the state-sponsored spread of WTMD.
We must try to abstain from obliterating any more states, and if we do, to think through the aftermath. We should also:
1) Help restabilize Russia’s southern tier. Russia’s population is declining in absolute terms and her southern rim is still extremely volatile.
2) Finish the job of dismantling/securing the FSU’s WTMD (fully fund the Nuclear Threat Initiative).
3) Finish the job of securing the FSU’s WTMD developers (Sam Nunn’s group again).
Shocking and awing Najibullah-like characters might seem gratifying but is not necessarily optimum policy with respect to national security. Short-termism can be a deadly luxury.
If a statesman thinks things through, chaos or a vacuum of state power will rarely seem an acceptable alternative, even to some of the worst examples of “government” out there. Generals fight the last war, statesmen must consider the next.
Statehood confers a myriad of capacities. This makes the vacuum in failed and the chaos in failing states a national security risk.
Even more worrisome than state-sponsored terrorism is the state-sponsored spread of weapons and technologies of mass destruction (WTMD).
The end of the twentieth century combined the fall of the USSR with the rise of radical, intolerant, militant Islam (RIMI). This proved to be a combustible mix. While not a declared policy, we at a minimum enabled RIMI as part of our strategy to obliterate the USSR.
Although a noble goal, winning the Cold War in total fashion by annihilating the USSR was risky to our national security. We helped create one of the biggest failed state episodes in history.
The USSR had become the FSU and much of it was now an arms and scientific talent bazaar.
We compounded our risk by supporting a drunkard who allowed his cronies to plunder state and natural resources. For good measure, he also gave the go-ahead for the invasion of Chechnya.
Critics of current US foreign policy fault the US Administration for resurrecting British Imperial-era policies. Ironically, we are – perhaps unwittingly – pursuing a foreign policy designed by the Politburo almost 40 years ago.
By the 1970s, the Soviets realized that Islam posed a long-term threat to security along their southern border. Muslim fertility rates greatly out-stripped almost every other group’s both inside and outside Soviet borders. In part, Kremlin leaders addressed this threat by supporting a secular regime in Afghanistan.
What started out as a risky gambit against historical odds (even Alexander had to cut a face-saving deal, marry into a local clan, and leave after 3 years of vicious fighting) turned into a cataclysm.
Collapsing natural resource prices, a lousy economic system, and a politically and economically resurgent Anglo-American alliance made a precarious situation for the Soviets in Afghanistan even worse.
Nobody in the Kremlin envisioned the visceral response from Afghanistan’s nationalities. Their response was legitimized by Islam and fuelled by Arab cash. In our glee at Soviet misfortune, we poured in weapons, cash, and intelligence into Afghanistan. One of the bag men for this outside help to Afghanistan was a young, six foot five inch disaffected Saudi.
And the rest is unfortunately history.
“Expansionist” Islam as Connecticut’s Independent Senator calls it is a Malthusian certainty given current fertility trends. On the basis of population growth, the Mormon Church is a greater “threat.”
Different than for the Soviets, mainstream Islam does not pose a threat to our national security. RIMI does.
Further, our war should not be on global terrorism generally, but rather on state-sponsored terrorism.
These distinctions are important and worth remembering.
Our main war effort should be against the state-sponsored spread of WTMD.
We must try to abstain from obliterating any more states, and if we do, to think through the aftermath. We should also:
1) Help restabilize Russia’s southern tier. Russia’s population is declining in absolute terms and her southern rim is still extremely volatile.
2) Finish the job of dismantling/securing the FSU’s WTMD (fully fund the Nuclear Threat Initiative).
3) Finish the job of securing the FSU’s WTMD developers (Sam Nunn’s group again).
Shocking and awing Najibullah-like characters might seem gratifying but is not necessarily optimum policy with respect to national security. Short-termism can be a deadly luxury.
If a statesman thinks things through, chaos or a vacuum of state power will rarely seem an acceptable alternative, even to some of the worst examples of “government” out there. Generals fight the last war, statesmen must consider the next.
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