Najibullah could have been a contender

9/11 confirmed state-sponsored terrorism as a threat to national security. It is the equivalent of 16th century state-sponsored piracy. “Generic” terrorism, like free-lance piracy, is “only” a scourge.

Statehood confers a myriad of capacities. This makes the vacuum in failed and the chaos in failing states a national security risk.

Even more worrisome than state-sponsored terrorism is the state-sponsored spread of weapons and technologies of mass destruction (WTMD).

The end of the twentieth century combined the fall of the USSR with the rise of radical, intolerant, militant Islam (RIMI). This proved to be a combustible mix. While not a declared policy, we at a minimum enabled RIMI as part of our strategy to obliterate the USSR.

Although a noble goal, winning the Cold War in total fashion by annihilating the USSR was risky to our national security. We helped create one of the biggest failed state episodes in history.

The USSR had become the FSU and much of it was now an arms and scientific talent bazaar.

We compounded our risk by supporting a drunkard who allowed his cronies to plunder state and natural resources. For good measure, he also gave the go-ahead for the invasion of Chechnya.

Critics of current US foreign policy fault the US Administration for resurrecting British Imperial-era policies. Ironically, we are – perhaps unwittingly – pursuing a foreign policy designed by the Politburo almost 40 years ago.

By the 1970s, the Soviets realized that Islam posed a long-term threat to security along their southern border. Muslim fertility rates greatly out-stripped almost every other group’s both inside and outside Soviet borders. In part, Kremlin leaders addressed this threat by supporting a secular regime in Afghanistan.

What started out as a risky gambit against historical odds (even Alexander had to cut a face-saving deal, marry into a local clan, and leave after 3 years of vicious fighting) turned into a cataclysm.

Collapsing natural resource prices, a lousy economic system, and a politically and economically resurgent Anglo-American alliance made a precarious situation for the Soviets in Afghanistan even worse.

Nobody in the Kremlin envisioned the visceral response from Afghanistan’s nationalities. Their response was legitimized by Islam and fuelled by Arab cash. In our glee at Soviet misfortune, we poured in weapons, cash, and intelligence into Afghanistan. One of the bag men for this outside help to Afghanistan was a young, six foot five inch disaffected Saudi.

And the rest is unfortunately history.

“Expansionist” Islam as Connecticut’s Independent Senator calls it is a Malthusian certainty given current fertility trends. On the basis of population growth, the Mormon Church is a greater “threat.”

Different than for the Soviets, mainstream Islam does not pose a threat to our national security. RIMI does.

Further, our war should not be on global terrorism generally, but rather on state-sponsored terrorism.

These distinctions are important and worth remembering.

Our main war effort should be against the state-sponsored spread of WTMD.

We must try to abstain from obliterating any more states, and if we do, to think through the aftermath. We should also:

1) Help restabilize Russia’s southern tier. Russia’s population is declining in absolute terms and her southern rim is still extremely volatile.
2) Finish the job of dismantling/securing the FSU’s WTMD (fully fund the Nuclear Threat Initiative).
3) Finish the job of securing the FSU’s WTMD developers (Sam Nunn’s group again).

Shocking and awing Najibullah-like characters might seem gratifying but is not necessarily optimum policy with respect to national security. Short-termism can be a deadly luxury.

If a statesman thinks things through, chaos or a vacuum of state power will rarely seem an acceptable alternative, even to some of the worst examples of “government” out there. Generals fight the last war, statesmen must consider the next.